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Computers are being introduced into practically every area of clinical
practice. The use of this technology by practitioners has not gone
unchallenged. Specifically, new ethical problems are thought to be as-
sociated with using computers to make clinical assessments. Logistical
and procedural difficulties, however, have been the primary focus of
concern. In this paper the critique of computerized evaluation is ex-
panded, with attention directed to the computer "micro-world." Be-
cause the computer micro-world consists of several unwarranted
assumptions about the nature of social reality, clinical practice may be
affected in many undesireable ways. The theoretical underside of com-
puter use is illustrated to show how it shapes therapeutic (or diagnostic)
discourse.
Technology is proliferating in every area of society, including
clinical practice. Computer programs are now available that con-
duct intake interviews, administer, score, and interpret clinical
instruments, monitor treatment plans, and engage dients in ac-
tual therapeutic discourse (Murphy and Pardeck, 1986c; Par-
deck, 1988). Many practitioners believe that these developments
will improve the delivery of clinical services. They contend that
because this technology performs most activities faster and more
accurately than humans, patient care is more effective. Because
clinical software packages are unaffected by human judgements,
the claim is made that diagnoses and correctives free from error
can be provided (Pardeck and Murphy, 1986).
This use of technology in clinical settings, however, has not
gone unchallenged (Murphy and Pardeck, 1986a; Murphy and
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Pardeck, 1986d). One of the most sophisticated critiques of this
trend has been formulated by Matarazzo (1986). This paper
should be viewed as an attempt to build upon his work. None-
theless, he neglects an area of concern that deserves serious at-
tention. A key shortcoming of his analysis is that technology is
portrayed to be a tool, which may be used either correctly or
incorrectly. His approach overlooks an important finding by re-
searchers in the area of artificial intelligence (AI) that suggests
computer technology should not be conceptualized in this man-
ner. Simply put, Matarazzo ignores the problems that Jacques
Ellul (1964) claims are associated with the "technological ethic."
By doing this, the subtle ways in which the logic of data proc-
essing may alter clinical practice cannot be fully appreciated.
Technological Ethic and Computer Micro-World
Modern writers contend that computers do not operate on
the basis of technical knowledge alone. What this means is that
computers are not value-free, contrary to the view held by many
practitioners. In fact, in order for computers to process infor-
mation effectively, particular theoretical assumptions must be
accepted as valid. Taken together, these philosophical principles
constitute what writers such as Marvin Minsky and Seymour
Papert (Dreyfus, 1979) call the computer "micro-world."
The introduction of this construct into the study of com-
puters is quite revolutionary. For example, computers must now
be understood to supply their own data selection guidelines,
and thus data processing is not "value free." Computers are not
merely receptades into which data are placed, but play an active
role in conceptualizing various aspects of social life. Most im-
portant, as illustrated by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (1986), the
computer micro-world is able to create the illusion that com-
puters generate information untrammeled by situational exigen-
cies. Speaking facetiously, Ashley Montague states that the GIGO
principle has come to mean "garbage in-gospel out" (Roszak,
1986, p. 120). Computer-produced knowledge, in other words,
is commonly accepted to embody pure reason, unadulterated by
interpretation.
The computer micro-world, because it is sustained by
judgements that are presumed to be universally acceptable, is
Technological Ethic
able to lull persons into believing that opinion can be separated
categorically from fact (Murphy and Pardeck, 1986b). To quote
Guattari (1984, p. 114), the process of computerization intro-
duces the "differentiators" necessary to reinforce the usual dis-
tinction made between subjectivity and objectivity. This
demarche is accomplished by defining key aspects of both social
existence and the clinical milieu in technical terms.
Basic to the computer micro-world are three rubrics. First,
all phenomena are transformed into material objects. Second,
mathematics is adopted to provide these entities with an iden-
tity. And third, natural laws are assumed to sustain both natural
and social facts. What this means, for example, is that persons
are identified with their demographic characteristics, specific
symptoms are indicative of illness, and making a diagnosis is
equated with classifying traits. As Lyotard notes (1984, p. 4),
knowledge is transformed into "quantites of information."
Judgements become technical operations, thereby suggesting that
diagnoses and other dinical activities are scientific. Information,
stated simply, is reified, because certain beliefs about the world
are accepted unquestioningly as valid. These tenets constitute
the computer micro-world.
Ellul demonstrates how the introduction of technology cre-
ates the illusion that persons can control practically any process
more thoroughly than ever before. Most problematic, whenever
possible the increased use of high-tech instruments is encour-
aged, in order to formalize tasks. Subsequent to translating cog-
nitive operations into technical terms, for example, any activity
can be organized according to exact calculations. Because the
implementation of technical criteria allegedly does not require
interpretation, objective or unbiased assessments are deemed
possible. Technical competence thus becomes the cornerstone of
clinical practice. Yet in order to appreciate how this legerdemain
is perpetrated, the impact of the computer micro-world must be
examined further.
When developing software packages, the assumption is made
that persons are "rule-following, symbol-manipulating, rational
beings" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986, p. 123). Evident in this
description is the dualistic nature of language. Symbols are ma-
nipulated, thus suggesting that they exist independent of human
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intentions. Therefore, facts are stripped of their interpretive
meaning and easily classified. In point of fact, presupposed by
computerization is that symbols represent ""context-indepen-
dent, objective features of the real world" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus,
1986, p. 53). If this were not the case, information could never
be introduced into a computer.
Stated otherwise, language must be transformed into a sys-
tem of "digitalized signs" (Guattari, 1984, p. 87). This occurs
when the sign and signifier are imagined to be isomorphic. Thus
language does nothing more than "point to," "indicate," or "de-
scribe" something other than itself (Mitchell, 1986). As Jacques
Derrida (1973, p. 138) writes, speech "defers" to factors that are
allegedly more fundamental than linguistic acts. Most relevant
to this discussion, data are treated as inert objects, or "input,"
that can be made to conform readily to the logistical demands
imposed by computer programs. With this in mind, Jean-Fran-
cois Lyotard (1984, p. 86) declares that the appropriate unit of
knowledge in the so-called Computer Age is the information
"bit." As suggested earlier in this discussion, these bits of in-
formation are objectified and treated as an indubitable source
of knowledge. This view is criticized by Theodore Roszak (1986,
pp. 108-134) when he writes that computers deal with idealized
knowledge.
Computers can process information only when data are di-
vorced from situational contingencies and, thus, unambiguous.
These machines regulate effectively how symbols are used by
requiring that data fit neatly into the "conceptual digits" adopted
by computer programs to classify input. According to J. David
Bolter (1984, pp. 83-90), each piece of information is assigned
an "address space" into which it must be placed. Because data
are treated in this way, Hubert Dreyfus (1972, pp. 235-255)
charges that computerization "disembodies" information, for
knowledge is deprived of the interpretive qualities that provide
it with a human character. Therefore, Margaret Boden's (1977,
pp. 15-17) claim that computers do not "crunch" numbers, but,
more important, specify how symbols may be utilized, should
not startle anyone. But how does this change in thinking about
computers affect clinical practice?
Technological Ethic
Technology and Clinical Practice
Suggested by the use of computers is that knowledge can be
severed from its interpretive context, without any appreciable
loss of meaning. In other words, transforming clinical infor-
mation into measurable quantities is not necessarily disruptive.
Yet social phenomena defy this simplistic form of analysis. Facts
are not unambiguous and easily classified, unless these phe-
nomena are misconstrued and mistreated. Imbued with inter-
pretation, clinical data must be approached sensitively, or their
social significance will be lost. The interpretive importance of
facts, in other words, must be grasped, if a relevant diagnosis
is to be generated. However, this sort of sensitivity is not es-
sential to the success of computerization. Central to the use of
computers are formal logic and the categorization of input.
Murphy and Pardeck (1985) maintain, accordingly, that com-
puters convey imagery that "deanimates" the clinical setting.
Due to the emphasis that is placed on formalization, comput-
erization is accompanied by a belief in realism. Sometimes this
viewpoint is referred to as "instrumental realism" (Ihde, 1979).
Although Matarazzo recognizes that computers unduly objectify
data, the rationale he invokes to support this observation is
unclear. By introducing the notion of instrumental realism, this
fault in his argument can be rectified. Simply put, the computer
micro-world is designed to objectify events, and thus, as Matar-
azzo notes, clinical evaluations are equated with testing rather
than assessment.
Tests produce findings, while assessments are more encom-
passing and include the element of human sensitivity. Assess-
ments, in other words, are not based solely on technical criteria.
Nonetheless, the presumption that the use of tests can be equated
with the generation of high quality data is believed to be entirely
justified. When technologically mediated, every facet of a clinical
setting is defined in such a way that testing is viewed naturally
to produce high quality information. The process whereby com-
puterization encodes patients constitutes the social component
of the technological ethic. As described by Guattari (1984,
pp. 135-143), a patient's behavior is envisaged to be "subjectless
action." Actually, what is most problematic about technologically
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
mediated therapy is the assumption that diagnoses should be
objectified. Therefore, the following considerations must be ad-
dressed by anyone who incorporates computers into clinical
practice, for the application of the computer micro-world to ana-
lyzing social affairs is thought to be suspect:
1. In any theory of ethics the issue of epistemology must be
addressed, for truth provides the foundation of social order.
Therapeutic discourse must be based on norms, or facts, that
apply to both therapists and patients. Yet computerization de-
mands that facts be treated as if they are thing-like, as required
by the logic of data processing. While those who use computers
can manipulate data in almost unlimited number of ways, each
piece of information can have only a single identity. Nonethe-
less, are facts this obtrusive? Modem writers argue that reality
is derived from "language games (Lyotard, 1984). Jacques Lacan
(1977, p. 306), for instance, insists that truth originates from
speech, not reality. Their point is that health and illness are not
natural states, but behaviors that have linguistic meaning. The
"effective procedures" used by computers to regulate client-ther-
apist interaction, however, are not intended to accomodate the
linquistic side of facts. Hence the interpretive nature of a diag-
nosis is minimized, thereby obscuring the social dimension of
a client's problem.
2. Considering the image of knowledge indigenous to com-
puterization, no-one should be surprised that facts unmolested
by opinion are believed to hold the key to a valid diagnosis. A
patient, therefore, must be treated as having traits similar to
anyone who has the same malady. But, as recognized by Ma-
tarazzo, an identical test profile does not necessarily have the
same meaning for every client. When diagnoses are guided by
axiomatic principles, however, such a finding suggests the pres-
ence of human error. The possibility that a particular symptom
may be understood in a variety of ways, depending on cultural
or other interpretive factors, is ignored. This omission is what
the Dreyfuses (1986, p. 76) have in mind when they state that
"expert systems" are internally consistent, but oblivous to the
world. As a result, each dient is approached erroneously as a
"typical" case.
3. When knowledge is objectified and data collection dean-
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imated, clinical judgements are often based on information that
may not be relevant. Because computerization idealizes one type
of information, while diminishing the importance of others,
data derived from technical procedures are assumed to be most
germain to making a diagnosis. Moreover, Kleinmuntz (1984)
suggests that reduced reliance on intuitive insight will probably
improve the accuracy of clinical judgements. Yet as diagnostic
skill comes to be equated with technical competence, the art of
intervention begins to atrophy. Clinicians may begin to focus
on methodological and procedural concerns, rather than relevant
situational considerations that differentiate reality from illusion.
And when technical standards are not socially paramount, modes
of behavioral classification that are primarily technically based
are reductionistic. This sort of reductionism is prevalent when
so-called "soft" information is treated automatically as ancillary
to quantitative data. Such myopia may invalidate altogether the
diagnostic process, for the linquistic significance of behavior
cannot be easily circumscribed.
4. Giving "calculative rationality" primacy when making a
diagnosis tends to engender a particular type of relationship
between client and therapist (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986,
pp. 163-167). Furthermore, this style of interaction may not be
fruitful, because, using Michel Foucault's (1973, pp. 163-167)
terminology, the therapist's gaze is "mathematized." By this he
means that dinical discourse is reified. For instance, a client
must be approached objectively, for otherwise a dinician's
judgements will be sullied by nonempirical elements. Therefore,
a patient is assumed to represent a composite of facts, and thus
can be examined as simply another "case." As Martin Buber
might say, the client and therapist are encouraged to address
each other in an "I-it" manner, or stated otherwise, as objects
to be manipulated (Murphy, 1983).
Yet how valid can a diagnosis be when a client and therapist
do not respect each other? In a now classic statement, Joseph
Weizenbaum (1976, p. 270), creator of the interactive program
ELIZA, declares that respect is not a technical issue. With this
remark he is criticizing those who maintain that therapy can or
should be computerized. For without interpersonal sensitivity
how can persons help one another? As Buber notes, therapists
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must confirm their patients during therapy, or mutual under-
standing will never be achieved. Yet devoid of such intimacy,
therapy is nothing more than a means whereby one person
coerces or controls another. It is for this reason that contempo-
rary writers, such as Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Gilles
Deleuze, claim that psychologists and psychiatrists are nowa-
days nothing more than agents of normalization (Deleuze, 1977).
How can clients possibly be confirmed through the use of
the DSM-III? (Callahan and Longmire, 1986). Because this di-
agnostic format has been designed for eventual computerization,
the use of formal reasoning is all that is required to render a
diagnosis. By following the step-wise instructions provided by
a "decision tree," a patient's symptoms can be identified and
classified. Further, this can be accomplished without knowing
anything about a client's existential condition, or what Binswan-
ger (1963) refers to as a person's mode of "being-in-the-world."
Deprived of this type of insight, however, a clinician may never
comprehend the experiential character of illness. In a manner of
speaking, the DSM-III epitomizes the computerization of ther-
apy. Rules are simply followed until a diagnosis is reached,
without any concern for whether or not the judgements that
substantiate this diagnostic scheme have any social relevance.
Accordingly, precision is inappropriately equated accuracy.
Conclusion
The point of this paper is to indicate that a computer is not
simply a tool, for it is underpinned by specific philosophical
assumptions that may shape the clinical setting. The computer
micro-world, in other words, contains a social component that
is able to dictate the nature of therapeutic discourse. As Matar-
azzo suggests, this underside of technology may reinforce the
objectivity thesis to such an extent that a client's needs are dis-
torted. Yet, most important, it is the technological ethic that is
dangerous and not necessarily computers.
Currently some writers are arguing that the technological
ethic can be tempered somewhat by placing computers in a
"reflexive environment" (Murphy, Mickunas, and Pilotta, 1986).
This type of situation can be created by recognizing a few points.
First, data are not strictly empirical but have meaning. Under-
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standing this meaning is important if a client's behavior is to be
correctly interpreted. Second, a methodology constitutes a data
collection program, and thus is not merely a tool. Recognizing
the procedural and philosophical assumptions that accompany
a methodology allows their limitations to be revealed. And third,
interpersonal discourse requires communicative and not just
technical competence. In other words, a client and therapist must
appreciate the value-base of each other's reality, before mutual
understanding is possible. If these three ideas are instituted,
computers may be used profitably by practitioners. For it must
be remembered, computer use requires that data be clarified,
and not that they be defined solely in an empirical manner.
References
Binswanger, L. (1963). Being-in-the-world. New York: Basic Books.
Boden, M. (1977). Artificial intelligence and natural man. New York: Basic Books.
Bolter, J. D. (1984). Turings's man: Western culture in the computer age. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Callahan, L. and Longmire, D. The role of reason in the control of mental
illness. In J. Murphy, A. Mickunas, and J. Pilotta (Eds.), The underside
of high-tech (pp. 53-65). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Deluze, G. (1977). Nomad thought. In D. Allison (Ed.), The New Neitzache
(pp. 142-149). New York: Delta.
Derrida, J. (1973). Speech and phenomena. New York: Harper and Row.
Dreyfus, H. L. (1972). What computers can't do. New York: Harper and Row.
Dreyfus, H. (1979). A Framework for misrepresenting knowledge. In
M. Ringle (ed.), Philosophical perspectives in artificial intelligence (pp. 124-
136). Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
Dreyfus, H. and Dreyfus, S. (1986). Mind over machine. New York: The Free
Press.
Ellul, J. (1964). The technological society. New York: Random House.
Foucault, M. (1973). The birth of the clinic. New York: Vintage Books.
Guattari, F. (1984). Molecular revolution. Doredrecht: D. Reidel.
Ihde, D. (1979). Technics and praxis. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Kleinmuntz, B. (1984). The scientific study of clinical judgements in psy-
chology and medicine. Clinical psychology Review, 4, 111-126.
Lacan, J. (1977). Ecrits. New York: W. W. Norton.
Lyotard, J. (1984). The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge. Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Matarazzo, J. (1986). Computerized clinical test interpretations: unvalidated
plus all mean and no sigma. American Psychologist, 41, 14-24.
Mitchell, W. (1986). Iconology: Image, text, ideology. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Murphy, J. W. (1983). The social philosophy of Martin Burber. Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America.
Murphy, J. W. and Pardeck, J. T. (1985). The technological world-view and
the responsible use of computers in the classroom. Journal of Education,
167, 98-108.
Murphy, J. W. and Pardeck, J. T. (1986a). Technology and the manufacture
of madness: a new dimension. The International Journal of Social Psychia-
try, 32, 41-46.
Murphy, J. W. and Pardeck, J. T. (1986b). Computers and cognitive devel-
opment: a preliminary statement. Early Child Development and Care, 25,
221-230.
Murphy, J. W. and Pardeck, J. T. (1986c). Technologically mediated therapy:
a critique. Social Casework, 67, 1986, 605-612.
Murphy, J. W. and Pardeck, J. T. (1986d). Computerized clinical practice:
promises and shortcomings. Psychological Reports, 59, 1099-1113.
Murphy, J. W., Mickunas, A. and Pilotta, J. (Eds.). (1986). The underside of
high-tech. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Pardeck, J. T. (1988). Microcomputer technology in clinical practice: an anal-
ysis of ethical issues. Journal of Independent Social Work, in press.
Pardeck, J. T. and Murphy, J. W. (1986). Microcomputer technology in clin-
ical social work practice: benefits and problems. ARETE, 11, 35-42.
Roszak, T. (1986). The cult of information. New York: Pantheon Books.
Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason. New York: N. H.
Freeman.
